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Abstract
Many people believe that economists in general are more selfish than other people and that this greater selfishness
is due to economics education. This paper offers empirical evidence against this widely held belief. Using a unique
data set on giving behaviour in connection with two social funds at the University of Zurich, it is shown that
economics education does not make people act more selfishly. Rather, this natural experiment suggests that the
particular behaviour of economists can be explained by a selection effect.
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What are economics students like?
Students of economics are often said to behave more selfishly than other people, and mostly
laboratory evidence exists to support this claim.1 But it is possible that students play the
equilibrium learned in their economics classes, but don’t apply it to real life situations. We
use a large data set of more than 96,500 observations to study the behaviour of economics
students in a natural setting. This data set allows us to analyse whether a possible difference
in behaviour is due to the indoctrination of economic education or due to self-selection.
The data
Each semester, students at the University of Zurich have to decide whether they want to
contribute to two official social funds, in addition to paying the compulsory tuition fee.
On the official letter for renewing their registration, the students are asked whether they
want to voluntarily donate CHF 7.– (about US$ 4.20) to a fund which offers cheap loans
to needy students and/or CHF 5.– (about US$ 3) to a second fund supporting foreigners
who study at the University of Zurich. Our data take into account the decisions of 28,586
students over a period of five semesters (winter semester 1998/99 up to and including the
winter semester 2000/2001). The students decide an average 3.4 times (depending on the
number of semesters attended), generating a total of 96,783 observations.
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Table 1. Percentage of economists and non-economists who contribute to the
two social funds (University of Zurich 1998–2000).
Economists Non-economists Total
Contribution to at least one fund 61.80 68.65 67.95
(6072) (59694) (65766)
Contribution to foreigner fund only 4.14 4.46 4.43
(407) (3879) (4286)
Contribution to loans fund only 2.79 2.35 2.39
(274) (2042) (2316)
Contribution to both 54.87 61.84 61.13
(5391) (53773) (59164)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
(9825) (86958) (96783)
Data source: Compiled from data provided by the accounting department of the
University of Zurich.
Students of economics at the University of Zurich undertake a basic study of about
2 years. After passing an exam, they enter the main stage of their studies and have to
choose between political or business economics. After graduating, the students may then
take up their PhD study. The organisation of the study allows to control for different levels
of economics knowledge.
Analysis and results
Table 1 seems to indicate that economists are more selfish than other students. 61.8 percent
of the economic students (political and business economists) contribute to at least one of
the funds, compared to 68.7 percent of the students with other majors.
In the following sections, these patterns are tested, controlling for the gender and age
structure of the different groups. Moreover, the exten of economic knowledge of the students
is controlled for.
Is there a selection effect?
To distinguish between the selection and the indoctrination hypothesis, we look at the
decision of whether to contribute or not to a social fund when first starting university
(freshmen). Differences between students of various disciplines at the very beginning of
their studies (without having been to a single lecture in economics) support the selection
hypothesis. We control for economic knowledge acquired at high school, the main source
of pre-university economics training. The dummy variable pre-university knowledge equals
1 if the students attended a high school with an economic orientation and 0 otherwise.
Table 2 presents the results of a probit analysis. The dichotomous dependent variable
equals 1 if the student contributes to at least one fund, and equals 0 if the student decides not
to give any money at all. Throughout the analysis, we look at the minimum contribution (‘to
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Table 2. Contribution of economists and non-economists (University of Zurich 1998–2000 dichotomous
dependent variable: ‘Contribution to at least one fund’ = 1 probit estimates).
Variable Coefficient Z-value Marginal effect (%)
Economist (1 = economist) −0.082∗∗ −3.455 −2.9
Stages of study
Freshmen −0.088∗∗ −4.254 −3.1
Freshman∗ economist −0.022 −0.413 −0.7
Main stage 0.112∗∗ 8.697 4.0
Main stage∗ economist −0.192∗∗ −6.152 −6.9
Ph.D. −0.006 −0.346 −0.2
Ph.D.∗ economist 0.128∗∗ 2.599 4.6
Pre-university knowledge −0.109∗∗ −9.576 −3.9
Control variables
Age 26–30 −0.006 −0.488 −0.2
Age 31–35 0.188∗∗ 11.021 6.7
Age 36–40 0.363∗∗ 16.165 12.9
Aged over 40 0.526∗∗ 21.552 18.7
Gender (female = 1) −0.030∗∗ −3.439 −1.1
Nationality (foreigner = 1) −0.109∗∗ −8.233 −3.9
Number of semesters −0.046∗∗ −23.034 −1.6
(Number of semesters)2 0.001∗∗ 13.729 0.02
Period 2 (summer semester 1999) 0.076∗∗ 5.599 2.7
Period 3 (winter semester 99/00) 0.138∗∗ 10.466 4.9
Period 4 (summer semester 2000) 0.134∗∗ 9.890 4.8
Period 5 (winter semester 00/01) 0.174∗∗ 13.172 6.2
Constant 0.670∗∗ 40.382
N 96,783
Log likelihood −59461.91
Notes: Reference group consists of ‘non-economists’, ‘basic study’, ‘without pre-university economic knowledge’,
‘aged below 26’, ‘male’, ‘Swiss’, ‘semester 1998/99’.
Level of significance: ∗0.01 < p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
Data source: Compiled from data provided by the accounting department of the University of Zurich.
at least one of the funds’).2 Control variables are personal factors (age, gender, nationality
and the numbers of semesters studied at the University of Zurich) and dummy variables for
the semester/year in question.
The first part of Table 2 suggests that a selection effect indeed exists. Students of
economics in the broad sense (students cannot choose between business and political
economics until they reach the main stage of their studies) donate less to the funds compared
to non-economics students. The probability that an economist contributes to one or both
of the funds is about 3 percentage points less than for a non-economist. To show that this
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lower willingness to contribute exists at the very beginning of the studies, the variable for
economists has to be interpreted along with “being a freshman in economics” (freshman
economist). The results suggest that already when the very first decision is made whether
to contribute or not (it happens before the first lecture in economics), economics students
act more selfishly than non-economists do.
Is there an indoctrination effect?
The more students of economics learn about the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, the more
they become aware that it is “rational” not to contribute. For students not familiar with
economic theory, such a decline in cooperation should not take place. If the difference in
giving behaviour between the students of economics and the other disciplines increases
with each additional semester, the indoctrination hypothesis is not rejected. In order to
capture specific knowledge in economics, we compare the behaviour of the students at
each stage of their studies. The reference group consists of non-economists in the basic
stage of their studies. The results in Table 2 provide an inconsistent picture with respect
to the indoctrination effect: Moving from the basic stage to the main stage of University
education raises students’ readiness to help other students financially by 4.0 percentage
points. The coefficient on the dummy for Main stage Economist measures the differences
between economists and non-economists when entering the main stage, and hence serves
as a test for possible indoctrination effects. For economics students entering the main stage
of their studies, the probability of contributing to the fund is reduced by 6.9 percentage
points—in addition to the general effect for entering the main stage. But this result does not
necessarily indicate the impact of indoctrination, because the probability of contributing
increases for doctoral students in economics, while the willingness to donate decreases
for doctoral students in other disciplines. If indoctrination really influences the behaviour
of students, the effect should be strongest at the doctoral level, where the students have
absorbed the largest amount of economics teaching.
Compared to students in the basic stage, students in the main stage of their studies may
possibly reflect the selection process that has taken place because a high number of students
do not pass the exam enabling them to enter the main stage. The same argument can be
raised with respect to Ph.D. students, who certainly differ in many respects from students
working only for their Masters Degree. To eliminate a possible sample selection bias, we
tested the indoctrination effect in a conditional logit model, with personal fixed effects using
the panel structure of the data. Thus, unobserved personal characteristics are held constant.
The estimates do not support a negative effect of economics education on giving and are
therefore not shown here, so a selection bias can be excluded. The possible indoctrination
effects of Table 1 must therefore be due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Behaviour of students of political and business economics
Table 3 focuses on the differences in contributing to the funds between the two types of
students of the economic sciences, between “political economists” on the one hand and
“business economists” on the other hand. Students are allowed to choose between the
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Table 3. Contribution of political and business economists (University of Zurich 1998–2000) dichotomous
dependent variable: ‘Contribution to at least one fund’ = 1.
Model I Model II
Probit estimate Conditional fixed effect logit
Variable Coefficient Z-value
Marginal
effect (%) Coefficient Z-value
Economist (in the broad sense) −0.103∗∗ −4.794 −3.7
Stages of study
Freshmen −0.091∗∗ −4.461 −3.3 −0.421∗∗ −6.265
Freshman∗ economist −0.001 −0.018 −0.03 0.400∗ 2.532
Main stage 0.106∗∗ 8.406 3.8 0.060 0.839
Main stage∗ political economist 0.088 1.402 3.1 0.864 1.652
Main stage∗ business economist −0.213∗∗ −6.788 −7.6 0.103 0.575
Ph.D. −0.008 −0.430 −0.3 −0.198 −1.199
Ph.D.∗ political economist 0.178∗ 2.099 6.3 0.473 0.377
Ph.D.∗ business economist 0.099 1.733 3.5 0.341 0.430
Pre-university economic
knowledge
−0.109∗∗ −9.568 −3.9
Control variables
Age 0.107∗ 2.329
Age 26–30 −0.007 −0.568 −0.3
Age 31–35 0.188∗∗ 11.046 6.7
Age 36–40 0.363∗∗ 16.164 12.9
Age over 40 0.526∗∗ 21.556 18.7
Gender (female = 1) −0.029∗∗ −3.354 −1.0
Nationality (foreigner = 1) −0.109∗∗ −8.256 −3.9
Number of semesters −0.046∗∗ −23.049 −1.6 −0.039 −1.566
(Number of semesters)2 0.001∗∗ 13.739 0
Period 2 (summer semester 1999) 0.077∗∗ 5.698 2.8
Period 3 (winter semester
1999/00)
0.140∗∗ 10.635 5.0
Period 4 (summer semester 2000) 0.136∗∗ 10.032 4.9
Period 5 (winter semester
2000/01)
0.176∗∗ 13.356 6.3
Constant 0.672∗∗ 40.639
N 96,783 29,874
Log likelihood −59456.66 −11148.81
(LR chi2) 100.48
Notes: Reference group consists of ‘non-economists’, ‘basic study’, ‘without pre-university economic knowledge’,
‘aged below 26’, ‘male’, ‘Swiss’, ‘semester 1998/99’.
Level of significance: ∗0.01 < p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Data source: Compiled from data provided by the accounting department of the University of Zurich.
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two economics majors only when entering the main stage of their studies, i.e. after they
pass the exams concluding the basic stage of their studies (after approximately two years).
Most prior studies (e.g., Carter and Irons, 1991) have concentrated exclusively on political
economists. The analysis presented here allows us to distinguish between the different types
of economics students and include those who study business economics.
As can be seen in Table 3, political economists differ from other students to the same
extent as when they started University. The effect of political economists entering the main
stage (Main stage Political Economist) is positive. Thus, the differences between economists
and non-economists even decreases, but this effect is not statistically significant. In contrast,
the probability of business students contributing to the social funds is—in addition to the
general effect—over 7 percentage points lower in the main stage than in the basic study. The
results do not support the effect of education in economics, because political economists
do not show any (statistically significant) behavioural differences from non-economics
students. But the paper—as well as prior studies—is primarily interested in the behaviour
of political economists because they study economic theory most intensively. Thus, an
alleged indoctrination effect should be the greatest in this group. Again we ran a conditional
fixed-effect logit model (model II in Table 3) to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The
results support the conclusion that economics education does not have a negative impact
on the willingness to contribute.
As students can only choose between studying political or business economics after the
initial 2 years, we do not know if the general effect of Economist (in the widest sense) has to
be attributed to political or business economists. But the five semesters enable us to observe
how students, who later chose to study either political or business economics, behaved in
their basic study. The raw data is already convincing: among business economists, whose
behaviour we know from the basic study, 61 percent donated money to at least one fund.
In contrast, 73 percent of political economists contributed in the basic stage to at least one
fund. This suggests that the selection effect identified is almost entirely due to business
students.
Conclusions
The analysis of the actual behaviour of the students with respect to donating money to a
fund as a pure public good allows us to draw three conclusions:
(i) Political economists’ willingness to donate money does not diminish by studying
economic theory;
(ii) The students of business economics give significantly less than other students;
(iii) The lower contribution of business economists, compared to other students, is due to
self-selection rather than indoctrination.
The conclusions are important for two quite different reasons:
– Political economists need not fear that they have a negative effect on students’ behaviour
with respect to altruistic giving. The students and, in particular, the graduates studying for
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a doctoral degree, well understand that political economics does not offer any normative
advice with respect to giving.
– The charge often made against political economists, that they produce the type of selfish
homo oeconomicus they assume in their theories, is therefore unfounded.
Notes
1. Marwell and Ames (1981), Carter and Irons (1991), Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993, 1996), Frey,
Pommerehne and Gygi (1993), Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996), Laband and Beil (1999) and Frank
and Schulze (2000).
2. Multinominal logit analysis of the estimated models does not change the results at all and is therefore not
reported here.
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